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This paper is intended to provide an overview of three current 
interrelated political processes in KwaZulu-Natal: township 
'unrest', or more correctly, political violence; negotiation, with 
specific reference to the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba; and, the strategic 
and tactical logic of black liberation politics. 
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING BLACK LIBERATION POLITICS IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
In this paper the concept of liberation is applied to that hotchpotch of 
black^ organisations which share an anti-apartheid stance. On the 
KwaZulu-Natal stage there are two principal actors opposed to the 
state's apartheid policies. 
1. The 'Broad Alliance' . 
The 'broad alliance' (for want of a more precise term) essentially 
refers to the civic and youth affiliates of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) and the independent trade unions, in the main affiliates of the 
Congress cf South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Affiliates of national 
youth organisations, such as the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) 
and the South African National Students' Congress (SANSCO), churches 
(Diakonia) and professional bodies, including the National Medical and 
Dental Association (NAMDA), the National Association for Democratic 
Lawyers (NAMDEL) and the National Education Union of South Africa 
(NEUSA), work in close co-operation with affiliates of the UDF and 
COSATU. Many of the youth and some of the professional organisations are 
directly affilated to the UDF. 
2. Inkatha. 
Operating from within state created institutions, such as the bantustans 
and black local authorities, are the KwaZulu administration and numerous 
township/community councils. In KwaZulu-Natal many of these groups 
operate under the banner of Inkatha. 
In theory both the 'broad alliance' and Inkatha are committed to a 
"non-racial democracy", or rather some form of bourgeois democratic 
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solution (notwithstanding some important exceptions on the part of 
minority organisations within the 'broad alliance'). However, 
fundamental differences emerge at the level of strategy. Inkatha favours 
a conservative moderate solution while the 'broad alliance' seeks a 
radical militant solution. Respective adherence to these strategies as a 
matter of principle exposes the full extent of the cleavage between the 
'broad alliance' and Inkatha. This division has been accentuated, 
however, by the inability of the Inkatha leadership to coherently argue 
aqainst the criticism that participation in government created 
structures reduces the organisation to a state functionary. At the level 
of appearances it is this conflict over strategy within the politics of 
liberation that has turned the struggle for a non-racial democracy into 
a battle for hegemony. 
PART 1: THE POLITICS OF TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE 
To understand the township 'wars' that have plagued KwaZulu-Natal since 
the late 1970's we must analyse the material and ideological origins of 
the principal actors and at the same time compare their utterances with 
their actions. At this point, however, the state's influence on strategy 
must be recognised. Ttiis influence stems directly from the state's use 
of coercion which, as an instrument for the extension of its 
apparatuses, has become a role model in black liberation politics. In 
South Africa the politics of coercion override the politics of 
negotiation. Even where the state does consent to negotiation it 
invariably unilaterally defines what is negotiable. While the relatively 
weak power base of both the 'broad alliance' and Inkatha restricts their 
definition of anti-state resistance to a bargaining process, the 
freguent use of ooercion between, and within, individual organisations 
is casting an ominous shadow over the future and suggests that organis-
ational capacity does not match discourse. 
The Material and Ideological Bases of Liberation Politics 
The presence of two diverse forces in Natal is the result of a frag-
mented political consciousness. This condition arises from the 
situational location of grievances and the material gains, or lack of 
them, that each force makes from its structural position within the 
state's carefully fostered dual system of township administration and 
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biased development programmes. African townships in Natal are 
administered by either the government through the province (previously 
Development Boards and prior to that Administration Boards) or the 
KwaZulu administration. Compared with residents in the former, people 
living in the bantustan townships are less financially burdened by high 
rents and service charges, have enjoyed secure housing and home 
ownership and escaped prosecution under influx control regulations. With 
regard to development, KwaZulu administered townships have received 
preferential treatment in an attempt to 'encourage' urban Africans to 
relocate in the bantustans. A related strategy, and one critical to this 
thesis, is that of raising the cost of urban residence for Africans 
outside the bantustans by increasing housing rents, service charges and 
transport costs. 
The Broad Alliance' 
The material basis of the 'broad alliance' exists at two interrelated 
levels: local, predominantly in state administered townships, in 
response to specific community grievances such as shortages of housinq 
and high rents, inferior education, rising transportation costs and 
chronic unemployment; and national, as a consequence of broader 
political issues including the community council system, the tricameral 
parliament, the presence of security forces in black townships, 
repression of peaceful protest and other government 'initiatives' . It 
was in response to local issues that civic based groups initially 
mobilised while national issues precipitated the coalescence of these 
groups into broad based anti-government and anti-apartheid fronts (and -
for those few groups which linked specific issues such as rents to 
economic exploitation at the site of production - anti-capitalist 
organisations). 
Thus, material inequalities clearly define the various structural 
positions in the social formation of the 'broad alliance': the churches 
and professional bodies are patently petty bourgeois in membership and 
programme; the youth organisations comprise a mixed membership dominated 
by radical fractions of the petty bourgeoisie; while intellectuals have 
often assumed leading roles in civic organisations and the independent 
trade unions. However, while civic organisations concentrate their 
efforts on blurring class distinctions and reinforcing solidarity using 
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the "we are oppressed residents/women/blacks" approach, the latter is 
attempting to build a class-conscious proletariat. In the absence of a 
resource base from which material rewards can be offered to supporters, 
all these organisations have been forced to build support and foster 
cohesiveness by articulating the source of grievance, that is, the 
state's definition of social relationships and enforced objective 
inegualities. 
In Part 3 of this paper we will analyse the strategic logic of the 
'broad alliance' in detail. Here it is suffice to note that the basic 
strategy of "non-co-operation with the government" and "non-partici-
pation in government created institutions" is underpinned by the 
philosophical assumption that the antagonisms between the ruling bloc 
and the oppressed are simply beyond negotiation. Rather, the ruling bloc 
must be destroyed and replaced. In this sense, the strategies of the 
'broad alliance' are consistent with their structural position. 
Inkatha 
Just as the strategies adopted by the unfranchised powerless 'broad 
alliance' are consistent with their structural position in the social 
formation as described above, so too does Inkatha's strategy derive from 
its structural location. The leadership is middle class comprising 
tribal chiefs, traders and professional civil servants employed in the 
upper echelons of the KwaZulu public service who are dependent upon the 
ruling bloc for their positions and apartheid's protective regulations 
for accumulation. Not surprisingly, they perceive domination in terms of 
race rather than economic exploitation. Any noise Inkatha makes about 
"redistribution" is ostensibly about access to opportunity within a free 
enterprise system. 
To ensure its position the Inkatha leadership has 'captured' the KwaZulu 
administration by 'winning' control of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 
(KLA). Of the 119 members of the KLA 65 are nominated through the tribal 
authority system (traditional tribal chiefs were made chairmen of rural 
Inkatha branches while township councillors became chairpersons in their 
ward) and 54 were 'elected', effectively nominated by Inkatha. The 
entire KwaZulu cabinet forms the executive of Inkatha. 
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This relationship between Inkatha and the KLA is a source of strength 
and weakness. On the one hand, it gives Inkatha control over resources 
denied to the 'broad alliance' . Inkatha allocates land and housing, 
provides jobs in the civil administration including education, health 
and crime prevention. Moreover, by operating within a state created 
institution the Inkatha leadership escapes state repression in the form 
of harassment, detentions and banninqs. On the other hand, the 
relationship limits strategic and tactical flexibility. For example, 
Inkatha cannot pursue boycott tactics: it controls township administra-
tions, education through the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture 
(DEC), and many transport routes through the KwaZulu Department of 
Transport. Similarly, many leaders have various retail interests which 
effectively discounts consumer boycotts. In the same vein support for 
economic sanctions is contrary to development via foreign investment. 
Here mention must also be made of Inkatha's appeal to the masses through 
its manipulation of Zulu ethnicity and its promise of 'risk free' 
liberation. Inkatha's doctrine delegates responsibility for liberation 
to the leadership. Since the latter has rejected engaging the "all 
powerful" state in armed struggle Inkatha supporters are reassured that 
their lives will not be senselessly sacrificed in the pursuit of 
liberation. However, while Inkatha excludes anti-state violence as a 
strategic option it certainly has not been shy in resorting to violence 
against opposition organisations which it regards as inferior. 
The Conflict 
While non-participation strategies are clearly incompatable with 
negotiation, the actual terrain of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal has largely 
been shaped by Inkatha's control over township administrations, its 
jurisdiction over education in the bantustan, and its attempts to subdue 
the independent trade union movement. It is these three areas, local 
government, education, and labour, that have precipitated the conflict 
between Inkatha and the 'broad alliance' and they are examined in turn. 
1. Local Government 
As part of the state's strategy of raising the cost of urban residence 
for Africans outside the bantustans, the then administrators of these 
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townships in the southern Natal region, the Port Natal Administration 
Board (PNAB), announced in early 1983 that rents and service charges 
would be increased by an initial 63 percent to be followed by 15 percent 
increases introduced at six monthly intervals for at least two years. 
The various township communities within the ambit of the PNAB coalesced 
to form the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) to articulate and direct 
their protest. 
Inkatha was drawn into the dispute through its public support of the 
long discredited community council system and the fact that most 
councillors campaign during elections on an Inkatha ticket. Although 
as part of the advisory structure to the PNAB the councillors were not 
in fact informed of the pending increases and were caught unawares as 
were the rest of the community. However, they were unable to convince 
their respective constituents that they were not privy to the proposed 
increases and were accused of complicity. Attacks were directed against 
councillors and their property and they retreated to their support base 
- Inkatha. This tactical manoeuvre enabled Inkatha to redefine the 
attack against the councillors as an attack against Inkatha and battle 
lines were drawn. 
At the height of this conflict in mid-1983 two events exacerbated the 
situation. First, the state entered the stage with its announcement that 
it intended to incorporate Lamont into KwaZulu. At the centre of JORAC's 
operations Lamont was the most strategically important of the PNAB 
townships. Incorporation was rejected outright by township residents as 
they perceived that their legal status would be adversely affected in 
terms of permanent urban rights, that with regard to pensions they 
would be worse off under a KwaZulu administration, and because they saw 
the KwaZulu administration as illegitimate. These conditions sharpened 
the focus of the conflict between JORAC as a civic association and 
Inkatha as representative of the KwaZulu administration. Second, the UDF 
was formed and its anti-bantustan rhetoric reinforced the divisions in 
black liberation politics. As one of the nearly 600 founding affiliates 
JORAC could also draw on a larger support base. 
Finally, mention must be made of the state's interventions in local 
township politics. In 1984 and 1986 the Ningizimu community council 
invited the South African Police and the South African Defence Force to 
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conduct "anti-crime sweeps" in Lamont and these seriously impaired 
Inkatha's legitimacy as a liberation movement making it possible for the 
'broad alliance' to define Inkatha as a state functionary. 
2. Education 
That education is part of the contested terrain in South Africa is 
openly evident as demands for "peoples' education" and its corollary 
"peoples' power" indicate. These demands reflect popular perceptions of 
education as an instrument for laying the foundations for a non-racial 
and democratic society. The current crisis in education is thus not 
about resistance to enlightenment, literacy or information, but rather 
to the underlying philosophy of a politically planned system and the 
refusal of the state to build non-racial structures that will enable 
blacks to participate in the moulding of the future society. 
While the passing of control over education in KwaZulu to the DEC in 
1977 was in fact consistent with the government's strategy of creating 
separate black educational institutions to reproduce a black 'buffer' 
class, for the KwaZulu administration control over education meant that 
education under its auspices had been liberated. Not surprisingly then, 
Inkatha regarded resistance to education within the bantustan as the 
antithesis of its philosophy. Pupils, however, do not draw ideological 
boundaries between the DEC and the Department of Education and Training 
(DET) which controls education in African schools outside the bantu-
stans. The introduction of ubuntu-botho, or Inkatha education, to DEC 
schools in 1979 merely confirmed that Tnkatha was supplanting one set of 
inimical ideals, values and norms for another. For example, while the 
DET is charged with administering bantu education which is perceived by 
blacks as an education for the subservient, ubuntu-botho stresses defer-
ence to authority and reduces the status of common people to service and 
loyalty to the leader. 
At the strategic level resistance in education has been largely based on 
attempts to remove the fetters of domination and to have a greater say 
in the organisation of educational institutions. In this regard the 
replacement of school committees by various combinations of parent, 
teacher, and pupil bodies is seen to be of paramount importance. While 
the state has imposed elaborate security measures in DET schools to 
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contain resistance, efforts in DEC schools have been roughshod. Inkatha 
aligned vigilantes patrol school grounds and the battles between pupils 
and vigilantes are well documented, and in fact are the subject of 
ongoing court cases. For example, the killing of seven vigilantes by 
school youths in KwaMashu and the retaliation against the families of 
members of Student Representative Councils in May 1986; and, the 
abduction and subseguent murder of seven schoolboys by allegedly Inkatha 
aligned vigilantes in KwaMashu earlier this year. Moreover, these 
battles have not been confined to KwaZulu. Among the resolutions passed 
at the National Education Crisis Committee's (NECC) consultative 
conference held in Durban in 1986 was that Inkatha be declared an enemy 
of the people. During the conference NECC delegates were assaulted by 
Inkatha aligned vigilantes. 
3. Labour 
Since the two day stayaway in the Transvaal in Novemeber 1984 the indep-
endent trade union movement has actively sided with community organ-
isations against the state. Given that Inkatha's structural position 
mitigates against such strategies, which it describes as "harming the 
cause of liberation", these strategies have been a source of division. 
Resolutions passed at the launch of COSATO in 1985 exposed the full 
extent of ideological divisions between the two forces: for example, the 
right of workers to assert themselves politically; the rejection of 
bantustans and federalism as solutions to South Africa's problems; and, 
support for disinvestment. 'Socialist' alternatives proposed by COSATU 
obviously challenge Inkatha's road to a free-enterprise economy, which 
includes investment in parastatals, for example the KwaZulu Finance and 
Investment Corporation (KFC), and the tripartite companies, such as OK 
Bazaars and Checkers, within the bantustan. 
Ideological and rhetorical struggles shifted to physical attacks on both 
unionists and union property following the formation of the Inkatha 
backed United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) with its free 
enterprise ideology in 1986. UWUSA aggravated community conflicts 
because labour tensions were expressed as being between COSATU and 
Inkatha, rather than COSATJ and UWUSA. For example, at Mpophomeni 
(Howick) in December 1986 members of the Metal and Allied Workers Union 
(MAWU) and their families were assaulted and murdered allegedly by 
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uniformed KwaZulu policemen and Inkatha members. At the time MAWU was 
fighting an Industrial Court case for the re-instatement of 950 workers 
dismissed by BTR-Sarmcol. UWUSA subsequently gained recognition at the 
factory. Moreover, the antagonistic relationship between Inkatha and the 
independent trade union movement is compounded by Inkatha's structural 
position as an employer of labour through the KwaZulu administration. 
Inkatha is thus placed in the contradictory position of being an 
employer and defender of workers' interests. Of course, how workers will 
resolve the contradiction of being members of both Inkatha and COSATU 
remains to be ascertained. Finally, while Inkatha has been the victim of 
coercion in the arena of local government and education, this has not 
been the case on the labour front with the overwhelming majority of 
assaults being directed against COSATU members. 
At tnis point let us shift the focus of attention to the KwaZulu-Natal 
Indaba - a political exercise described by the organisers (the KLA and 
the Provincial Administration) as an attempt to bring together all 
groups in the region to negotiate a solution to local problems. 
Immediately the reader should be alerted to the fact that the limi-
tations of the Indaba relate closely to the structures and forces that 
have shaped the terrain of conflict within black liberation politics: 
those which propelled Inkatha headlong into support of the Indaba and 
the 'broad alliance' to reject it. 
PART 2: THE KWAZULU-NATAL INDABA 
The recommendations of the Indaba can be grouped into administrative, 
economic and political measures designed to address reforms in edu-
cation, health and welfare, and the much heralded bill of rights. 
If the administrative proposals adopted by the Indaba reflect a common 
sense rationalisation and utilisation of scarce resources the same 
cannot be said of the economic and political recommendations. 
Ttie economic recommendations of the Indaba clearly reflect the interests 
of capital and its inability to meet black aspirations. While notions of 
equality of opportunity through a non-racial meritocracy ushered in with 
the demise of apartheid register loud in the pronouncements of partici-
pants, the precise mechanisms by which a non-racial meritocracy provides 
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for greater access to resources and opportunity are never elucidated. 
Presumably it is the "invisible hand" of classic liberalism. Of course, 
in a meritocracy the failure of individuals to achieve success falls 
into the realm of personal deficiences, while institutional blockages 
are conveniently ignored. Additionally, there has been a shattering 
silence among participants regarding the redistribution of land. In 
these senses, access to equal opportunity in the 1990's is not intended 
to redress historical inequities. 
In the political context, the Indaba does not address the problem of 
transposing a regional process to a national process. This is a critical 
problem because the 'broad alliance' has rejected regional solutions. By 
an extension of reasoning the same problem has implications for the Bill 
of Rights as a protective document for individual rights. In South 
Africa the abuse of individual rights typically manifests under security 
legislation, for example, detentions, bannings and the prohibition of 
gatherings. Constitutionally, this legislation falls under the juris-
diction of the central government which is not about to relinquish its 
sovereignty. 
Given that conflict in South Africa is underpinned by a crisis in 
legitimacy, the guestion of representation at the Indaba is fundamental. 
Apart from structural factors (briefly introduced in Part 1) several 
mechanisms prevented participation by elements of the 'broad alliance' . 
First, the Indaba reflects a consociational process which by definition 
proceeds at the level of elites and negates grassroots participation. 
Second, organisations invited to attend were resticted to one repre-
sentative which was hardly proportional to organisational strength and 
ensured that the balance of power remained with the organisers, all the 
more so given that it was impossible for banned organisations to attend. 
Similarly, those organisations which require a mandate from their 
members before making decisions, notably the independent trade unions, 
were given approximately a fortnight to debate the issue internally. 
Third, the discussions were conducted under a cloak of secrecy which 
immediately placed the process beyond the hallmarks of democracy, that 
is, mandates, accessibility and accountability. For these reasons the 
'broad alliance' declined to participate and their absence ensured that 
the Indaba is unrepresentative of the people of KwaZulu-Natal. 
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At first glance any notion that the KwaZulu-Natal region could simul-
taneously witness processes of confrontation and negotiation would 
appear as a contradiction, particularly in view of the overlap of actors 
involved in both processes. This 'contradiction' dissolves, however, in 
light of the structural positions of the 'broad alliance' and Inkatha: 
it is these very positions that have given rise to the antagonistic 
relationship within black liberation politics. The current township 
'wars' are indicative of the intensity of this relationship. 
It is interesting to reflect on the forms this violence assumes and how 
it has been distorted by the state and the white liberal and conser-
vative press. Most obviously, this distortion is reflected through the 
wide use of the euphemism 'unrest' and the misleading concepts of 
faction fighting and black on black violence. While the "non-partici-
pation" policy is not by definition violent, boycott and protest 
strategies (see Part 3) have tended to end in violence. This occurs at 
two levels: when protesters confront a high profile and aggressive state 
'defensive' machinery; and, when disorganised protests rely on coercion 
for 'support' . In contrast, Inkatha's non-violent image stems from its 
well publicised rejection of anti-state violence and its skilful 
manipulation of the media to the extent that its (alleged) use of 
coercion for 'support' (e.g. the UWUSA launch) is carefully disguised 
while its violent forays against the 'broad alliance' are portrayed as 
being in self-defence. Given that violence in self-defence is justified 
in law, Inkatha's violence is widely accepted, and in some cases tacitly 
condoned, because its structural position means that it is not only 
defending itself, but also the ruling bloc. 
Only an imprudent observer would deny that Inkatha is an actor in the 
politics of liberation. However, in rejecting the state's apartheid 
policies, Inkatha has adopted a contradictory stance: it both challenges 
the state's interests (mainly by issuing threats at conferences and 
rallies) and serves the state's interests (through its participation in 
government created structures). Whether or not Inkatha's politics of 
negotiation will liberate blacks from apartheid is one issue but it 
clearly has no intention of trying to transform society. What, then, of 
the 'broad alliance' - is it capable of bringing about any form of 
liberation? This is the theme in Part 3 of this paper. 
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PART 3: THE 'BROAD ALLIANCE1: A CRITIQUE OF RESISTANCE STRATEGIES 
Defining Resistance 
The South African state has traditionally relied upon coercion to crush 
challenges to structural inegualities which manifest themselves as 
material and status inequalities between black and white. Within the 
'broad alliance' the state thus became defined as organised coercion 
lacking any semblance of legitimate authority. Strategic shifts in the 
state's mode of containment, notably social reforms, have done little to 
alleviate negative perceptions of the state (all the more so because of 
its failure to address material grievances). Regardless of the state's 
tactical manoeuvres the 'broad alliance's' resistance continues to be 
conceptualised as a bargaining process: an attempt by disadvantaged 
groups to redefine the power relations. 
While the anti-state and anti-racial solidarity of the 'broad alliance' 
disguises critical internal tensions in what are otherwise essentially 
heterogeneous collectives, at this point it is important to note the 
strategic advantages accruing from such alliances. First, if single 
organisations are easily isolated (e.g., by legislation, decree, or the 
removal of leadership by detention or assassination) this is not the 
case with broad areas of confluence. Cross cutting leadership and 
membership facilitate not only the continuity of organisation but the 
diffusion of ideas. Seoond, whole communities, including traditionally 
conservative strata, are more easily conscientised and drawn into broad 
based collectives. Examples abound of groups that have inadvertently 
been drawn into resistance organisations because of the very structure 
of these organisations. One example is taxidrivers providing transport 
to commuters boycotting transport monopolies especially when the drivers 
themselves become the victims of police harassment. 
Visions of the Future 
Resistance in South Africa is a bargaining process to gain access to 
power. To the powerless, politics and economics are not irrelevant 
theroretical constructs but manifest in the form of unfranchised workers 
and chronic unemployment. Visions of the future are articulated through 
calls for a "democratic non-racial" society where resources are 
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"equitably distributed" and "people have control over their own lives". 
However, more often than not these values are vague notions lacking both 
a theoretical and analytical base. Moreover, they are expressed in 
negative terms rather than articulated in a positive programme. In this 
sense these values reflect the opposite of an existential anguish under 
apartheid and capitalism: a negation of systems they hold responsible 
for their plight. Ttius, "democracy and non-racialism" are contrary to 
"racial oppression"; "equitable redistribution" and "socialism" negate 
"exploitation and poverty"; and, "control over our own lives" reinforces 
the perception that people are denied this right. If these visions 
appear idealistic this reflects the extent to which the powerless 
nurture illusions. But their actions demonstrate a determination to 
escape their predicament and are the reality of these illusions - an 
often tragic, occasionally heroic, reality which is quantifiable in 
terms of casualties and deaths. While the 'luminaries' do have visions 
of the highway to the future, it must be stressed that they have not 
explicated these visions in concrete programmes (e.g., the Freedom 
Charter). 
The first lane facilitates political participation and the 'visionaries' 
demand that the government: renounces violence and removes "political" 
police (as distinct from anti-crime police) from the townships; frees 
political prisoners; releases detainees; allows people to express their 
political opinions; and, calls a national convention of the "people's 
representatives" to draw up a programme for the transfer of power. The 
second lane leads to "socialism". The argument of liberal economists 
that only a free enterprise economy can generate the wealth necessary to 
support the underdeveloped component of South Africa is dismissed. 
'Visionaries' articulate demands for the nationalisation of portions of 
industry; a taxation system that redistributes profits more effectively; 
and, a social security system that provides support for the unemployed, 
aged and infirm. The third lane leads to "education for liberation". 
Demands for "peoples' education" and its corollary "peoples' power" 
reflect popular perceptions of the role of education in "preparing and 
building a democratic South Africa". 
Demands alone do not produce change, all the more so when these demands 
are vague notions (e.g., "peoples' education" sic). To this end we must 
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examine the strategic logic of those resistance organisations which make 
such demands. Consideration must also be given to whether or not the 
strategies adopted by the 'broad alliance' are consistent with their 
choice of tactics and, of course, their visions of the future. 
Strategy and Tactics: A Critigue 
The evidence, that is the utterances and actions of the various resis-
tance organisations, suggests a two stage process of transformation. The 
first stage will culminate in the end of apartheid, the second will 
usher in a "democractic socialist" society. However, not all fractions 
of the 'broad alliance' necessarily subscribe to the second process, 
rather they merely seek the abolition of apartheid. 
The initial stage combines non-participation strategies (e.g., non-
participation in government created structures such as community 
councils), boycott strategies (e.g., commuter, consumer, education, and 
rent boycotts, and work stayaways and strikes) and protest strategies 
(e.g., peaceful protests, economic sanctions, disinvestment, disvestment 
and cultural, academic and sporting boycotts) with the building of 
alternative institutional structures (e.g., street committees, courts, 
schools and newspapers). The object of this process is to weaken the 
government so that when "the time is right" power can either be seized 
or negotiated from a position of strength. (Negotiation is the product 
of a balance of equal forces. At the present conjuncture the balance of 
power rests with the state which unilaterally defines what is 
negotiable.) 
"Non-co-operation with the government" and "non-participation in 
government created institutions" are cardinal attributes shared by 
resistance organisations. Violation of this principle has been 
responsible for the so called "black on black violence" - violence 
directed against those who have been co-opted into government created 
structures on the pretext that they are the people's leaders and 
represent their interests. 
While non-participation, protest, and boycott strategies do, of course, 
address day to day problems, particularly the alleviation of material 
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grievances, only in rare instances have they been conceived to force 
structural change in the broader political sense. More fundamentally, 
these strategies are an extension of those employed by the Black 
Consciousness Movement in the early 1970's: that is, as part of an 
"unfolding process" conceived to consclentise and mobilise people and 
make them aware that they have control over their lives. Conscientisa-
tion strategies have not only been directed at the most exploited 
segments in the community but both the black middle class and elements 
of the white race group have been identified as potential allies. The 
opinions and reactions of both groups to economic sanctions and cultural 
boycotts, in particular, have been monitored and attempts made to 
motivate a wider cross section of support for these strategies. 
In the post-Black Consciousness era the most powerful strategy in the 
conscientisation and mobilisation process has undoubtedly been the 
micro-committee formed as part of the alternative structure strategy, 
for example pupil, parent and teacher committees at individual schools 
and street committees in the townships. In some cases micro-committees 
have proved effective conscientising agents: street committees, for 
example, have spread the concept of democracy in many areas and have 
helped to eradicate petty crime by drawing the distinction between 
'right and wrong' on the one hand and 'legal and illegal' on the other. 
In this view the process of transformation to a "democratic socialist" 
society will begin once the fetters of apartheid are removed and "the 
people" gain access to power structures. Reformist strategies will then 
pave the way to a new social formation. By definition reform is a 
strategy conducted within existing social institutions. At the macro-
level reform emphasises constitutionalism, electoralism and represen-
tation. Interestingly, resistance organisations reject the notion of 
reform at the present conjuncture. Yet, its very actions have forced the 
government to create the space in which it could at least begin to adopt 
reform strategies. For example, via participation in black local 
authorities, regional services councils, the tricameral parliament and 
the national statutory council, or even by forging alliances with white 
oppostion political parties. Similarly, and contrary to government 
pronouncements (and notwithstanding the occasional 'blunder'), 
resistance organisations reject the path of insurrection as a matter of 
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policy. In fact most organisations recognise that psychological advan-
tages accrue from speaking in pacific tones of negotiation and recon-
ciliation. 
Because neither process is bound by time contraints evaluative assess-
ments of strategy are somewhat limited. Nonetheless judgements and 
projections can be made on the basis of what has been achieved. Let us 
look at the successes. 
* The proliferation of community organisations and the guality of debate 
about the future of South Africa, conducted under the auspices of the 
'broad alliance', indicate large numbers of people have been conscien-
tised and mobilised against the state. In the past decade nearly every 
aspect of South African society has been politicised. Positive effects 
arising from these developments include co-operation between disparate 
groups (e.g., the NECC and the schools' boycott) and critical evaluation 
and clarification of strategic objectives (e.g., the strategic shifts of 
the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee and the NECC based on self analysis 
and the assessment of state power). Pilgrimages to Lusaka and Dakar 
demonstrate that business groups and white professional associations 
have been drawn into the process. 
* Compared with the 'forces of moderation' (i.e., high profile bantustan 
leaders, transnational companies operating under the guise of corporate 
responsibility and white opposition political parties) the 'broad 
alliance' has elicited international sympathy for its cause and isolated 
the South African state. These pressures have forced the government to 
deviate from its policy of overt repression and undertake social reform. 
This strategic shift has exposed underlying tensions within the 
government, between the reformists on the one hand and 'reactionaries' 
on the other, and point to a structural weakness open to further 
exploitation. 
* Tn two notable cases, the NECC and the independent trade unions, 
effective alternative structures have been developed and recognised. For 
example, the NECC has proposed an alternative curriculum and the unions 
have spread the concept of democracy on the factory floor. 
Notwithstanding the above, the strategies and tactics adopted rais
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practical problems and critical conceptual issues. 
Practical problems have largely arisen through the choice of tactics 
which, by definition, activate strategies. For example, in terms of the 
strategy of non-participation in black local authorities resistance 
organisations have forced councillors to resign. Unfortunately, many of 
the tactics have been spontaneous expressions of protest in response to 
specific 'fuse' factors and as such situated at the street level. 
Although spontaneous tactics range from peaceful demonstrations to 
violent outbursts, reaction does not necessarily reflect the intensity 
of the 'fuse' nor would it necessarily be repeated under similar circum-
stances. The spontaneity of many tactics highlights another facet of the 
'broad alliance' in the mid-1980's: what counts above all else is the 
act of decision making (i.e., having "control over our own lives") 
regardless of the costs of that decision. 
Not surprisingly, spontaneous resistance has resulted in numerous 
'blunders' which have contributed to the mobilisation of 'reactionary' 
forces (e.g., Inkatha). 'Blunders', such as failing to give adeguate 
notice to commuters of an impending transport boycott and then stoning 
buses, arise from poor communication and inadequate planning. Such 
actions are often perceived as criminal acts, particularly when the 
distinction between political protest and crime is blurred (e.g., when 
businesses are looted). Redefining political protest as 'crime' intially 
served the interests of conservative vigilante groups in their pogrom 
against 'criminals' in the name of "law and order" (i.e., an excuse to 
consolidate local power bases). In the past 18 months however, the 
pendulum has swung again. Vigilantes are being openly criticised for 
their excesses and people are turning to organisations within the 'broad 
alliance' for 'protection' . As noted above, the current township 'wars' 
in Durban and Pietermaritzburg reflect such divisions. The real 
benefactor under these circumstances is, of course, the state which uses 
"black on black" violence to justify apartheid doctrine. 
Other tactics have been poorly conceptualised. The tactic of rendering 
townships ungovernable created power vacuums which, instead of being 
filled by organised and disciplined forces, created niches for criminals 
and/or vigilantes. Protracted school boycotts raised logistic and 
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communication problems for organisers who were no longer afforded the 
cover provided by official institutions. Tactics responsible for 
increasing material hardship among the poor, such as confiscating 
shopping during consumer boycotts, merely blur the distinction between 
'victor' and 'victim' . While coercion may legitimately override an 
individual's autonomy, where 'free riders' reap the benefits of 
collective action while avoiding the private costs, the problem lies in 
striking a balance between force and effective communication and 
decision making. Finally, the destruction of public property (regardless 
of how inadequate) results in the loss of facilities which are not 
easily replaced. 
The government's consistently confirmed commitment to the protection of 
minority group rights implies that apartheid is far from being 
abolished. Moreover, the state of emergency demonstrates the regime's 
capacity to defend its interests (i.e., minority group rights). Altern-
ative structures defined by the government as "threatening law and 
order" have been simply crushed or severely curtailed. It should be 
remembered that independent trade unions and the NECC (mentioned above 
as having achieved success) function with a relative measure of 
tolerance from the state. 
Other strategies are fallacious. For example, the notion that economic 
sanctions will precipitate the collapse of the government. Far from 
questioning why sanctions were imposed and exerting political pressure 
for more social reform, business has sought economic solutions and 
geared itself to turning the negative aspects of sanctions into 
advantages (to paraphrase a recent newspaper headline, "Sanctions 
produce millionaires"!). Remember also the positive effect of the arms 
embargo, not only on the economy but on Defence Force morale. Non-
selective^ applied academic and cultural boycotts of South Africa are 
double-edged swords that limit the diffusion of ideas, opinions and 
options and finally, international sympathy should not be misconstrued 
as concrete support. 
Let us assume for the moment that apartheid is abolished and resistance 
organisations are invited to take part in government - what then? A 
likely answer is - not much. 
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The 'broad alliance' is essentially a loose coalition at a specific 
conjuncture with little more than the specificity of apartheid holding 
it together. The strength of resistance is based on a very tentative 
alliance between 'populism' (itself an alliance of classes whose 
economic interests differ but who find a common cause against the 
regime) and 'workerism' (independent workers' organisations which serve 
the interests of the proletariat). The weakness of such alliances has 
been demonstrated in Zimbabwe, for example, where independent trade 
unions have been suppressed. Simply, once access to the power structures 
has been facilitated internal cleavages invariably surface between those 
groups committed to ideological purity (in some instances at the expense 
of tactical flexibility) and those groups whose interests match their 
bourgeois positions. 
The v?gue pronouncements of the 'populists' (e.g., "the people shall 
govern") suggest they are more concerned with social reform leading to a 
welfare state, than wholesale transformation. Social, or conservative, 
reform is simply the process of redressing grievances: it is synonymous 
with 'improvement' . While trade union consciousness and welfare states 
have developed elsewhere during periods of social reform, the process 
invariably leaves the inherent characteristics of the existing social 
formation intact. In other words, 'improvements' neqate neither class 
exploitation nor oppression. 
Reformist strategies will confront agents of conservatism and 
stabilisation which cannot be dismissed as irrelevant in the process of 
transformation. These will include not only the firmly entrenched ruling 
bloc (industrial, commercial and financial interests, 'non-political' 
conservative associations, pressure groups and organisations, and the 
bureaucracy) but the affluent and influential middle classes, including 
a burgeoning black middle class ushered in by the demise of apartheid. 
These groups will variously appeal to the government to reject workers' 
demands, to be 'reasonable' and to 'postpone' further change until a 
more 'appropriate' time. Right wing fascist-type groups can also be 
expected to emerge which may even seek alliances with conservative 
elements. In other words, access to government is not the power to 
govern. 
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The 'Fluid' Space 
A decade of intense resistance based on non-participation, boycott and 
protest strategies has not brought the Pretoria regime to its knees. 
Nonetheless it has provided the 'broad alliance' with one very tangible 
reward - space in which to manoeuvre. However, this space is 'fluid': 
some times expanding, at other times contracting. At the present 
conjuncture, under the state of emergency, this space is rapidly 
diminishing. This imposes a severe constraint under which resistance 
organisations must re-evaluate their strategies and tactics. They must 
continue to build effective alternative structures and at the same time 
reappraise their spontaneous protest 'cretenism' . 
CONCLUSION: THE ROAD TO LIBERATION 
Black liberation will only be realised in South Africa when there is a 
shift in the balance of power between the state and the opposition 
to a point where the state is either forced to negotiate or capitulate. 
Whether the principal actors can sufficiently increase their power bases 
to the desired levels to force transition depends upon their ability to 
continue to build organisational strength (i.e., to spread the concept 
of participatory democracy) and, of course, their tactical flexibility 
in the face of the state's strategic and counter manoeuvres. 
As we have seen, the potential for building organisational strength 
displays wide variation. While the independent trade unions demonstrate 
a high potential, Inkatha under Buthelezi's leadership reflects the 
opposite. Inkatha is in fact the antithesis of participatory democracy. 
Between these two extremes exist a range of potentials. 
The post-Soweto decade confirms that the state is not a passive 
observer. On the contrary, since 1979 it has been successfully 
reorganising its internal security apparatus and forming crucial 
alliances (the latter in the name of social reform). The building blocks 
of the new insidious system of covert repression, the Joint Management 
Committees (JMC's), have permeated nearly every aspect of social life in 
South Africa and undoubtedly provided the state with the facility to 
move with incredible swiftness against its opponents under the state of 
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emergency. Simultaneously, community councillors, bantustan leaders and 
Indian and coloured politicans have blurred 'resistance' consciousness 
by paying their clients handsomely for "faithful service". 
For the 'broad alliance' the road to liberation is paved with many 
obstructions. In KwaZulu-Natal it is particularly treacherous. 
NOTE 
1. Terminology: The following words are used to denote membership of the 
respective racial groups: African, coloured, Indian and white. Ttie term 
black is used to collectively denote those people referred to by the 
governemnt as 'non-white' . The term bantustan is used in preference to 
the commonly used term 'homeland' . 
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